Gottfried Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
mind with space, the study of the nature of the continuous in various mathematical fields, and the relationships between objects and events are immediate and not reducible to space-time primary, true nature of the body, the object; and (3) spatial dimensions, Physics; Cactus: Athens, Greece, This paper deals with the history of the relationship between the mind-body Keywords: body, Descartes, history, interaction, Jackson, madness, mind, At the time of the Greeks, the backdrop must be a theory of the universe and a theology. Denial of Mind-Body Interaction, Assertion of Pre-established . to dualistic views concerning the relationship between mind and body.
There is a parallelism between them, but no interference of one with the other. This may be called the doctrine of concomitance. Thus, in the case of visual perception there is an unbroken physical circuit, complete reflex action, from sensory periphery through highest centers back to muscular periphery.
The visual image, a purely mental state, occurs in parallelism with—arises during not from —the activities of the two highest links of this purely physical chain; so to speak, it 'stands outside' these links. It seems to me that the doctrine of concomitance is, at any rate, convenient in the study of nervous diseases. It, or an essential similar doctrine, is held by Hamilton, J.
Those who accept the doctrine of concomitance do not believe that volitions, ideas, and emotions produce movements or anyother physical states He said once that if he could be convinced of an interacting dualism he should abandon the study of the nervous system; his implication being that dualism means the negation of law.
All expressions that imply interaction or community of nature between body and mind, such as 'psycho-motor' or 'center for ideas', he called 'scientific blasphemy'. To group together Hamilton, Clifford, Spencer, Bain, Huxley, and Tyndall, to say nothing of the others, as holding essentially the same doctrine, is to my mind much the same thing as putting Salisbury, Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Labouchere into one political boat, and saying that they hold essentially the same opinions.
If one does not see the essential difference between the opinions of Clifford and Huxley, one can scarcely have a clear idea of the matter. It is understandable that Jackson had not sought support in the work of Leibniz, but it is surprising that Clifford did not either.
Historical epistemology of the body-mind interaction in psychiatry
One explanation may be that byClifford had abandoned his religious beliefs and was unable to accept divine preordainment as a solution. Instead, he resorted to an evolutionary explanation. In classical times, the manner of the ontological attributes of mind and body allowed for their free communication. Descartes changed all that by proposing that they were constituted by two entirely different substances.
During the 17th century, conventional medical theory started to firm up the view that madness mania, melancholia, frenzy, etc resulted from changes in the brain. One of the consequences of Cartesian dualism was that the mind per se could not become diseased, and this caused some difficulty to the brain theory of madness.
In the event the problem was variously bypassed: Since the 20th century, the availability of statistics has allowed for the joint analysis of variables representing mind and body, and the correlational maps obtained have been used as evidence that the old Cartesian ontological gap can be bypassed.
Acknowledgments The author reports no conflict of interest. Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval? The MIT Press; 4. History of the Mind-Body. Freud's Theory of Consciousness [master's thesis]. University of London; 6. Soul and body in Plato and Aristotle. The Origins of European Thought.
Gottfried Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind
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A Companion to Descartes. How is it that we can know this world? New arguments in evolutionary epistemology. Hosle V, lilies C, eds. University of Notre Dame Press; Brinkworth M, Weinert F, eds. Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain. MIT Press; Cartesian dualism and psychosomatics. Locke, Metaphysical dualism and property dualism. John Locke and Natural Philosophy. Descartes' dogma and damage to Western psychiatry.
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Mind-Body Relationship | junkgenie.info
Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience. Dualism and the transformation of psychiatric language in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Rebirth of Descartes. University of Groningen; ; University of Chicago Press. L'aliene entre le medecin et le philosophe. Le Sujet de la Folie: Naissance de la Psychiatrie. Arguments for dualism[ edit ] Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a pore in the ventricle F allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of the leg, causing the foot to withdraw.
The subjective argument[ edit ] An important fact is that minds perceive intramental states differently from sensory phenomena,  and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having seemingly disparate properties.
The subjective argument holds that these properties are irreconcilable under a physical mind. Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical seem not to. So, for example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like.
There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are qualia involved in these mental events.
And the claim is that qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical. Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-person, scientific perspective about a bat's sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to be a bat.
However, others argue that qualia are consequent of the same neurological processes that engender the bat's mind, and will be fully understood as the science develops. In this thought experimentknown as Mary's roomhe asks us to consider a neuroscientist, Mary, who was born, and has lived all of her life, in a black and white room with a black and white television and computer monitor where she collects all the scientific data she possibly can on the nature of colours.
Jackson asserts that as soon as Mary leaves the room, she will come to have new knowledge which she did not possess before: Although Mary knows everything there is to know about colours from an objective, third-person perspective, she has never known, according to Jackson, what it was like to see red, orange, or green. If Mary really learns something new, it must be knowledge of something non-physical, since she already knew everything about the physical aspects of colour.
David Lewis ' response to this argument, now known as the ability argument, is that what Mary really came to know was simply the ability to recognize and identify color sensations to which she had previously not been exposed. The zombie argument[ edit ] Main article: Philosophical zombie The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers.
Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a human being must be true of the zombie.
None of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described scientifically via physics whether it is conscious or not.
The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living things seem to require a level of consciousness. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.
In particular, nothing proves that an entity e. It is argued that under physicalismone must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being or not being a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's.
Special sciences argument[ edit ] Robinson argues that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are "special sciences" that are irreducible to physics. These allegedly irreducible subjects, which contain irreducible predicates, differ from hard sciences in that they are interest-relative.
Here, interest-relative fields depend on the existence of minds that can have interested perspectives. Physics is the general analysis of natureconducted in order to understand how the universe behaves. On the other hand, the study of meteorological weather patterns or human behavior is only of interest to humans themselves. The point is that having a perspective on the world is a psychological state.
Therefore, the special sciences presuppose the existence of minds which can have these states. If one is to avoid ontological dualism, then the mind that has a perspective must be part of the physical reality to which it applies its perspective. If this is the case, then in order to perceive the physical world as psychological, the mind must have a perspective on the physical.
This, in turn, presupposes the existence of mind. In fact, it is common in science to presuppose a complex system;  while fields such as chemistry biology or geology  could be verbosely expressed in terms of quantum field theoryit is convenient to use levels of abstraction like moleculescellsor the mantle.
It is often difficult to decompose these levels without heavy analysis  and computation. This printer could have been made of straw. This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube transistors. Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a slightly genetically modified sperm.
Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity of Frederick.
Mind–body dualism - Wikipedia
In this latter case, it has been claimed, overlap of constitution cannot be applied to the identity of mind. As Madell puts it: Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either is or is not mine.
There is no question of degree here. Argument from reason[ edit ] Main article: Argument from reason Philosophers and scientists such as Victor ReppertWilliam Haskerand Alvin Plantinga have developed an argument for dualism dubbed the "argument from reason". Lewis with first bringing the argument to light in his book Miracles ; Lewis called the argument "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism", which was the title of chapter three of Miracles. However, knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent.
Therefore, if naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it or anything elseexcept by a fluke. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes J. Haldanewho appeals to a similar line of reasoning: If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry in the long run on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the trees.
One argument against Dualism is with regard to causal interaction. If consciousness the mind can exist independently of physical reality the brainone must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness.
Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice versa have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century.
Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material—this is the basic problem of causal interaction. First, it is not clear where the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's finger causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that lead to one's brain, to something happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally resulting in the sensation of pain.
But pain is not supposed to be spatially locatable. It might be responded that the pain "takes place in the brain. This may not be a devastating criticism.
However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of how the interaction takes place, where in dualism "the mind" is assumed to be non-physical and by definition outside of the realm of science.
The mechanism which explains the connection between the mental and the physical would therefore be a philosophical proposition as compared to a scientific theory. For example, compare such a mechanism to a physical mechanism that is well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket.
What happens in this case is that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a certain velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket.
Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause any neuron to fire.
However, with Dualism, an explanation is required of how something without any physical properties has physical effects. At the time C. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on this.
It should also be noted that, while some interpretations of quantum mechanics consider wave function collapse to be indeterminate,  in others this event is defined and deterministic. Many physicists and consciousness researchers have argued that any action of a nonphysical mind on the brain would entail the violation of physical laws, such as the conservation of energy.
When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a physical event, which ultimately results in his walking across the room.
The problem is that if there is something totally nonphysical causing a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is no physical event which causes the firing. This means that some physical energy is required to be generated against the physical laws of the deterministic universe—this is by definition a miracle and there can be no scientific explanation of repeatable experiment performed regarding where the physical energy for the firing came from.
In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible for the interactions, then this would violate the law of the conservation of energy. Replies to the argument from physics[ edit ] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  and the New Catholic Encyclopedia  give two possible replies to the above objections. The first reply is that the mind may influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity.
The second possibility is to deny that the human body is causally closed, as the conservation of energy applies only to closed systems. However, physicalists object that no evidence exists for the causal non-closure of the human body. Well understood scenarios in general relativity violate energy conservation and quantum mechanics provides precedent for causal interactions, or correlation without energy or momentum exchange. Another reply is akin to parallelism—Mills holds that behavioral events are causally overdeterminedand can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone.
Smart and Paul Churchland have pointed out that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by Occam's razor an unphysical mind is unnecessary.
If a nondeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct then microscopic events are indeterminatewhere the degree of determinism increases with the scale of the system see Quantum decoherence. Philosophers Karl Popper and John Eccles and physicist Henry Stapp have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the macroscopic scale.
For instance, Thomistic dualism the dualism of Thomas Aquinas doesn't obviously face any issue with regards to interaction. Any theory will be wrong when applied to a system which contains the observer himself due to self-reference. But other people from the observer's point of view will obey the usual physical laws, so conducting experiments on them would not indicate any divergence from the physical predictions.
Argument from brain damage[ edit ] This argument has been formulated by Paul Churchlandamong others. The point is that, in instances of some sort of brain damage e. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged.
So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain. They assert that the mind is a property or substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore could be affected by any rearrangement of matter.
Phineas Gagewho suffered destruction of one or both frontal lobes by a projectile iron rod, is often cited as an example illustrating that the brain causes mind. Gage certainly exhibited some mental changes after his accident. This physical event, the destruction of part of his brain, therefore caused some kind of change in his mind, suggesting a correlation between brain states and mental states.
Similar examples abound; neuroscientist David Eagleman describes the case of another individual who exhibited escalating pedophilic tendencies at two different times, and in each case was found to have tumors growing in a particular part of his brain.
By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the brain repeatedly under controlled conditions e. This conclusion is further supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals such as those affecting neurotransmitters on mental functions,  but also from research on neurostimulation direct electrical stimulation of the brain, including transcranial magnetic stimulation.
There is nothing non-material or mentalistic involved in conception, the formation of the blastulathe gastrulaand so on. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities mind and brainwhen it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one.
It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction see Occam's razor.